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Governance

The AI Governance Layer: prove how the system behaves, and who's accountable.

Six surfaces, 24 named controls, five ways a governance program lies, and the scoreboard that keeps them honest. This is the standing regime a shipped AI system has to hold up under a year later, not a checklist for getting one feature past review.

Updated First published

30 min read

Markdown

A security review is questionnaire prep to get one feature past InfoSec, Privacy, Risk, and Procurement once, before it ships. Governance is what has to keep holding a year later: the register that still lists what's actually running, the checkpoint a reviewer can still meaningfully disagree through, the logs that can still reconstruct a specific decision. See the security review for the one-time gate; this page is the regime underneath it.

None of the six surfaces below are optional because a system isn't classified as high-risk. A register, a named owner, and a system cardA system card is a short document stating an AI system's purpose, limits, and owner. cost little and answer a question someone will eventually ask regardless of classification. The rest scales to what the classification actually calls for.

As of 12 August 2026. Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 (the "Digital Omnibus on AI") deferred the EU AI Act's high-risk obligations to 2 December 2027 for stand-alone systems and 2 August 2028 for systems embedded in other products. The Article 5 prohibited-practices regime, the transparency duties, and the general-purpose-AI obligations were not part of that deferral. None of the six surfaces below depend on a compliance deadline: a register, a checkpoint a reviewer can actually contest, and a system card are worth building on the schedule your own risk already sets, independent of when a regulator starts checking. Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, EUR-Lex →

The six surfaces

What a governance program actually has to cover.#

Each surface fails a different way. None of them substitute for each other.

Diagram in six lanes, one per governance surface: inventory and classification; human oversight; and records and traceability. The other three are documentation and disclosure; third-party assurance; and monitoring and incidents. Each lane holds one node that shows the metric that surface watches. No edges connect the surfaces; each one covers separate ground. INVENTORY HUMAN OVERSIGHT RECORDS AND TRACEABILITY DISCLOSURE THIRD-PARTY ASSURANCE MONITORING & INCIDENTS Register coverage Override rate Retrievable trace Current system card Attestation age Report latency
Six governance surfaces cover a system from its first registration to its last incident report.
01

Inventory and classification

Covers: Every system that touches a model, who is accountable for it, and how much decision weight it actually carries.

Breaks when: A team ships a new integration through an already-approved platform, and the fact that it now touches a model never reaches whoever keeps the register.

Watch: Register coverage

02

Human oversight

Covers: Which actions a system may take unattended, and whether the person at the checkpoint can meaningfully disagree with it.

Breaks when: The checkpoint exists on a diagram, but the reviewer sees only the proposed action, not the evidence behind it, so agreeing is the only answer the interface actually supports.

Watch: Oversight override rate

03

Records and traceability

Covers: What was running, what it saw, and what it did, tied together well enough to answer for a specific past decision.

Breaks when: A log captures the prompt and the output, but not which model, index, or tool version produced them, so the exact decision can never be run again.

Watch: Share of decisions with a retrievable trace

04

Documentation and disclosure

Covers: What a system is for, what it must not be used for, and whether the people affected by it know AI is involved at all.

Breaks when: A system card exists in a wiki nobody outside engineering has read, so procurement improvises an answer to a question the card already settled.

Watch: Share of live systems with a current system card

05

Third-party and data assurance

Covers: What a model or library provider actually commits to on training use, retention, and sub-processors, and whether that commitment still holds.

Breaks when: A vendor's terms were read once at the procurement stage, and nobody has re-checked them since, including after that vendor quietly added a sub-processor.

Watch: p95 vendor attestation age

06

Monitoring, incidents and change control

Covers: What happens after launch: who watches it, what counts as an incident, and what re-triggers a review.

Breaks when: A dashboard tracks the right numbers, and the last person who looked at it left the company two quarters ago.

Watch: Declaration-to-report latency

The control bank

24 controls, six surfaces.#

Filter by how often it's exercised (continuous, periodic, triggered), then copy the visible list as a Markdown checklist.

01 Inventory and classification

Every governance question that follows assumes you can answer a prior one first: what AI is actually running, and who is accountable for it. That sounds trivial until a team ships a model call inside a feature nobody flagged as "AI," through a platform that was already approved for something else. This surface is the register that has to catch that case, classified by what a wrong decision would actually cost, not by which model or how large it is.

What it covers
A single, current list of every system in the organization that calls a model, however small the feature.
How to build it
One register, one owner, and a build or procurement gate that requires an entry before a model-touching feature ships.
Produces
A register that answers "what AI do we run" in one lookup instead of a round of Slack messages.
Tradeoff
A register nobody is required to update decays within a quarter (see the trap below). It needs a gate, not a request.
Prove it
Register coverage: share of systems actually running that have a current entry.
What it covers
One named person accountable for each system in the register, distinct from whichever team happens to maintain the code.
How to build it
A required "owner" field on the register entry, held by a named individual with the authority to pause the system, not a distribution list.
Produces
A single name to call when a system does something nobody expected, instead of a team that reassigns the question internally.
Tradeoff
Ownership has to survive reorgs and departures. An owner field that silently points at someone who left is worse than an honest blank.
Prove it
Share of register entries with a current, reachable owner.
What it covers
A tier per system based on what a wrong decision costs, independent of which model or how large it is.
How to build it
A short rubric, scored at registration and not inferred from the tech stack: does this decide something about a person, can it act without review, is the domain regulated.
Produces
A tier that tells you which of the other five surfaces to spend the most effort on for this specific system.
Tradeoff
A rubric that's too coarse puts everything in the same tier, which is the same as not classifying at all.
Prove it
Every register entry carries a tier, assigned before launch, not backfilled after a question.
What it covers
A written, specific definition of the change that forces a system back through classification and review.
How to build it
Name the triggers explicitly: a new data source, a materially different model, a new class of action the system can take. Review the list itself on a schedule so it doesn't quietly go stale.
Produces
A re-review that happens because a rule fired, not because someone happened to remember.
Tradeoff
Too broad a definition re-triggers review on routine changes and the team starts working around it; too narrow and real changes slip through untouched.
Prove it
Every re-review in the last period traces to a named trigger, not an ad hoc decision to check.

02 Human oversight

A human checkpoint that only ever approves isn't oversight, it's a delay with a signature on it. This surface is about designing the checkpoint so disagreement is a real, informed option: which actions never run unattended in the first place, what the reviewer actually gets to see before they decide, and what happens to someone who wants to contest an outcome after the fact.

What it covers
An explicit, written list of the actions a given system may never take without a human confirming first.
How to build it
Name the irreversible or high-stakes actions at design time, things like a refund, a termination, a diagnosis, and route each through a checkpoint before it executes.
Produces
A hard boundary the system can't reason its way around, instead of a guideline it can talk itself past.
Tradeoff
Every action on this list adds latency and a person's attention. Put too much on it and the checkpoint becomes the thing everyone routes around.
Prove it
Zero unattended executions of a listed action, checked against the actual call logs, not the design doc.
What it covers
What the person at the checkpoint actually sees before they approve or reject: the inputs and retrieved evidence behind a proposal, rather than the proposal alone.
How to build it
Surface the evidence the system used to reach its proposal alongside the proposal itself, and make rejection at least as easy as approval in the interface.
Produces
A checkpoint with a real reject rate, because rejecting is actually informed and actually easy.
Tradeoff
Showing full evidence takes more of the reviewer's time per decision. A checkpoint reviewers can't get through in the time they have gets rubber-stamped anyway.
Prove it
Reject rate above zero, and a reviewer who can explain a specific rejection from the evidence shown, not from outside knowledge.
What it covers
A real path for someone affected by a system's decision to challenge it and reach a human, distinct from the system itself.
How to build it
A named contact or process, separate from the system itself, with a committed response time.
Produces
A dispute path that exists before the first complaint, not one improvised in response to it.
Tradeoff
A contest route that routes back into the same automated system it's meant to check isn't actually a route.
Prove it
Median time from a contest being raised to a human response, tracked, not assumed.
What it covers
Whether the reviewer at a checkpoint actually understands what the system does and doesn't do well enough to catch a bad proposal.
How to build it
Onboarding and a refresher on the system's known failure modes for anyone who sits at a checkpoint, repeated as the system changes.
Produces
A reviewer who can name the specific way this system tends to be wrong, rather than a job title that happens to carry checkpoint access.
Tradeoff
Training takes time away from the review queue itself, and it goes stale as the system changes underneath the reviewer.
Prove it
Every checkpoint reviewer has completed training current to the system's last substantial change.

03 Records and traceability

A log that can't be reconstructed doesn't hold up once someone disputes a decision months later. This surface is what turns "we log things" into "we can answer for this specific decision": prompt, model, index, and tools versioned as one release, every decision's inputs and outputs logged against that version, retained past the window someone could dispute it, and provably reproducible on demand.

What it covers
One version identifier that pins the exact prompt, model, index snapshot, and tool set live at a given time.
How to build it
Bundle the four into a single release artifact with one version tag, the same discipline a normal software release already applies to code.
Produces
A version number a log entry can point to, so "what was running" is a lookup, not a guess.
Tradeoff
Versioning all four together is more release overhead than shipping a prompt tweak on its own. The alternative is a log nobody can actually resolve.
Prove it
Every logged decision resolves to one version identifier, checked by trying to resolve one at random.
What it covers
A single, complete log entry per decision: what went in, what was retrieved, what tools ran, and what came out.
How to build it
One structured log record per decision, keyed to the release version above, capturing all four elements instead of only the final output.
Produces
A decision that can be read back in full, not reconstructed from whichever pieces happened to get logged.
Tradeoff
Logging full inputs and retrieved context at this granularity is real storage and, for personal data, a real privacy-scoping decision, not a free add.
Prove it
A decision picked at random resolves to a complete log entry that someone actually checks, rather than one merely documented as policy.
What it covers
A retention period for decision records long enough to cover however long someone has to actually dispute one.
How to build it
Set retention against the real dispute or audit window for the system's domain, not a generic default carried over from an unrelated policy.
Produces
A record that still exists when the dispute actually arrives, instead of one deleted on schedule a month before.
Tradeoff
Longer retention is more storage and a larger exposure if that storage is ever breached. Retention should match the actual window, not default to "forever."
Prove it
Retention period documented and checked against the system's real dispute or audit window, not left as a database default.
What it covers
Whether the exact system that produced a specific past answer can actually be reconstructed and re-run, rather than only described.
How to build it
Pick a real past decision, pull its version and log entry, and re-run it end to end against the same inputs, as a drill rather than a one-time proof.
Produces
A demonstrated answer to "can you show me how this decision was made," instead of an assertion that you could if asked.
Tradeoff
Running the drill takes real time from whoever owns the system, and it only proves what it actually tested.
Prove it
Time to reconstruct a named past answer, measured against a real drill, not estimated.

04 Documentation and disclosure

A system card only engineering can find doesn't disclose anything to the people who actually need it: procurement, legal, a new hire. This surface is the system card every model-touching system needs: purpose, limits, data, evals, and owner, written so procurement can hand it to a counterparty without you in the room, plus the separate, harder discipline of telling a user when they're talking to AI and would otherwise have assumed a person.

What it covers
One document per system stating its purpose, limits, data sources, eval results, and owner.
How to build it
A short, structured template filled in at launch and updated at every substantial change, stored somewhere outside the codebase.
Produces
A single document that answers most of what procurement, legal, or a new team member will ask, before they ask it.
Tradeoff
A system card that isn't updated at the same trigger as the re-review above just becomes another stale document.
Prove it
Every register entry links to a system card dated at or after the system's last substantial change.
What it covers
An explicit, written boundary on what the system must not be used for, distinct from a description of what it does.
How to build it
A stated out-of-scope list on the system card itself, informed by the classification tier above.
Produces
A written answer to "can we use this for X" that exists before someone asks it in production.
Tradeoff
A boundary stated once and never revisited drifts out of date as the system, and what people try to use it for, both change.
Prove it
The out-of-scope statement is current as of the last substantial-change review, not the original launch date.
What it covers
Whether a user interacting with the system knows they're talking to, or being evaluated by, AI, in any case where they'd otherwise assume a person.
How to build it
A stated, visible disclosure at the point of interaction, not buried in a terms-of-service page nobody reads.
Produces
A user who isn't finding out after the fact that a decision or a conversation wasn't with a person.
Tradeoff
Over-disclosing on every trivial automation trains users to ignore the notice by the time it matters. Reserve it for cases where the assumption would genuinely be wrong.
Prove it
A fresh user, shown the interaction cold, correctly identifies whether AI was involved.
What it covers
A standing package of system card, eval results, and data-flow summary that answers a procurement or diligence question without a live meeting.
How to build it
Assemble the pack from documents that already exist elsewhere on this list, kept current, not written fresh under deadline for each ask.
Produces
A same-day answer to a procurement questionnaire instead of a scramble that stalls the deal.
Tradeoff
An evidence pack that's only assembled when asked is the trap below wearing a different name. It has to be maintained, not produced on request.
Prove it
The pack for a given system can be handed over within one business day of being asked, checked as a drill.

05 Third-party and data assurance

A vendor commitment you read once at signing and never checked again is worth exactly what you remember of it. This surface covers every provider a system depends on, including the open-weight models and libraries most inventories quietly exclude: which terms actually matter (training use, retention, sub-processors, residency), a re-attestation clock instead of a one-time procurement check, and a live answer to which data may cross which boundary, per system.

What it covers
The specific contract terms that actually govern risk: training-data use, retention, sub-processors, and data residency.
How to build it
Extract those four terms from every provider's agreement into the register entry itself, instead of leaving them inside a contract nobody re-opens.
Produces
A one-line answer to "does this vendor train on our data" instead of a search through a PDF.
Tradeoff
Contracts change. A pinned term that isn't re-checked against the current agreement is stale the moment the vendor updates its terms.
Prove it
Every third-party dependency has its four key terms recorded and dated.
What it covers
A recurring check that a vendor's terms and posture still match what was true when you signed.
How to build it
A fixed re-attestation interval per vendor, tied to the system's classification tier, not a one-time procurement checkbox.
Produces
A caught change in vendor terms or sub-processors within the re-attestation window, not whenever someone happens to reread the contract.
Tradeoff
Re-attesting every vendor on the same schedule wastes effort on low-tier dependencies. Tie the interval to the tier the vendor actually supports.
Prove it
p95 vendor attestation age, tracked against the interval each vendor is supposed to sit on.
What it covers
A live answer to which categories of data a given system is allowed to send to which provider or region.
How to build it
A data-flow map per system, recorded on the register entry and checked against the provider terms pinned above.
Produces
A direct answer to a residency or data-transfer question, without tracing the call path by hand.
Tradeoff
The map is only as good as its last update. A new data source added to a system without updating the map reopens exactly the question it was built to answer.
Prove it
The data-flow map for a system matches its actual current inputs, checked, not assumed from the original design.
What it covers
Whether a self-hosted open-weight model or a third-party library counts as a governed dependency, the same as a hosted API.
How to build it
Include self-hosted models and any library that materially shapes model behavior in the same register and re-attestation process as an API vendor.
Produces
One consistent boundary instead of a governance program that only sees the dependencies that send an invoice.
Tradeoff
There's no procurement contract to trigger the review, so it has to be pulled in deliberately at registration instead of arriving automatically.
Prove it
Self-hosted models and behavior-shaping libraries appear in the register with the same fields as an API vendor.

06 Monitoring, incidents and change control

None of the five surfaces above are worth much once a system is live if nobody is actually watching it, or if watching it means a dashboard nobody opens. This surface is post-deployment monitoring with a named owner, a working definition of what counts as an AI incident and who gets to declare one, a rollback path rehearsed across model, prompt, index, and tool config, and a rule for when a system, its data, or the rules it operates under change enough to re-run the whole review.

What it covers
Whether a named person is actually watching the system's live behavior, rather than whether a dashboard merely exists.
How to build it
Assign the owner named in the register to check specific, named metrics on a defined cadence, with an alert path when they cross a threshold.
Produces
A caught regression the week it starts, not the quarter someone happens to open the dashboard.
Tradeoff
Monitoring that alerts on too much gets tuned out. Alert on the metrics that actually predict a governance failure, not everything measurable.
Prove it
The named owner can show the last time they acted on an alert from this system, beyond confirming the dashboard exists.
What it covers
A written definition specific enough that two people looking at the same event agree on whether it's an incident.
How to build it
Name the categories that qualify: a harmful output that reached a user, an unattended action outside its allowed list, a confirmed injection. Name who has the authority to declare one, too.
Produces
A declared incident within the same day it happens, instead of a debate about whether it counts as one.
Tradeoff
A definition too broad turns routine bugs into incident-response events; too narrow and a real one gets waved off as ordinary.
Prove it
Declaration-to-report latency, measured from a real incident, not a tabletop exercise alone.
What it covers
Whether reverting a system to its last known-good version, versioned as one release above, actually works when tried.
How to build it
Run a real rollback drill on a schedule, rather than relying on a documented procedure nobody has executed.
Produces
A rollback that takes minutes because it's been done before, not one improvised for the first time during an actual incident.
Tradeoff
Rollback drills take engineering time on a schedule, whether or not anything is currently wrong.
Prove it
Time to complete a rollback drill, tracked per drill, not assumed from the runbook.
What it covers
Whether a substantial change, as defined in the inventory surface above, actually triggers a fresh pass through classification, oversight design, and disclosure.
How to build it
Wire the substantial-change trigger directly to a required re-review step, not a note to revisit it eventually.
Produces
A governance program that stays current with what the system actually became, not what it was at launch.
Tradeoff
Every re-review is real review time again. This only holds together if the substantial-change definition itself is neither too broad nor too narrow.
Prove it
Every substantial change in the last period has a matching, completed re-review on record.
Five ways a governance program lies

A policy is a claim, not an artifact.#

Every one of these looks like a passing program right up until someone asks to see the evidence.

A policy with no producible artifact

Looks like: A written governance policy exists, and everyone can describe it accurately, but nobody can hand over the document, log, or evidence pack it supposedly requires.

Costs you: The first time an auditor, a regulator, or a diligence team asks to see the artifact instead of hearing the policy, the gap between the two becomes the finding.

Fix: Treat the artifact as the deliverable, not the policy. If the evidence pack can't be produced within a business day, the policy isn't actually implemented yet.

See the control: Keep an evidence pack procurement can read without you in the room →

Rubber-stamp oversight

Looks like: A human checkpoint is in place, and the approval rate sits near 100% month after month.

Costs you: A near-universal approval rate is a finding about the checkpoint, not evidence the system is reliably right. It usually means the reviewer can't see enough to disagree, or doesn't have time to.

Fix: Redesign the checkpoint to surface the evidence behind a proposal, and track the reject rate as a health metric, not a nuisance number.

See the control: Design the checkpoint so the reviewer can actually disagree →

Logs without versions

Looks like: Every decision is logged, in detail, with a prompt and an output, but not which exact model, index, or tool configuration produced it.

Costs you: A log that can't be tied to a specific release can't be reconstructed. When someone disputes a decision, the answer becomes "probably" instead of a demonstration.

Fix: Version prompt, model, index, and tools as one release, and key every log entry to that version, not to a timestamp alone.

See the control: Version prompt, model, index and tools as one release →

A hand-maintained register, stale within a quarter

Looks like: A spreadsheet lists every AI system, updated by whoever remembers to, with no gate tied to it.

Costs you: New systems ship without an entry, decommissioned ones stay listed as live, and the register becomes a historical document rather than a current one, usually within a single quarter.

Fix: Tie registration to a real gate, a build or procurement step that can't complete without an entry, instead of relying on someone remembering.

See the control: Keep one register of every system that touches a model →

Vendor assurance frozen at the procurement date

Looks like: A vendor's terms were reviewed carefully once, at signing, and the resulting sign-off is treated as permanent.

Costs you: A vendor can add sub-processors, change retention terms, or shift training-data policy long after signing, and nothing in the process would ever notice.

Fix: Put every vendor on a re-attestation clock sized to the systems it supports, not a one-time procurement checkbox.

See the control: Re-attest vendors on a clock, not once at procurement →
The scoreboard

Six numbers, and how each one lies.#

Every one of these is measurable today. None of them is trustworthy read alone. Pair it with the number next to it.

Register coverage

Why it matters
Whether "what AI do we run" has a one-lookup answer or a round of Slack messages.
How it misleads
A high coverage number can still describe a register nobody has reconciled against what's actually deployed for months.
Pair with
Days since the register was last verified against production

Share of decisions with a retrievable trace

Why it matters
The direct measure of whether the records surface is a real capability or a policy document.
How it misleads
A high share can still hide a slow retrieval: the trace exists, but nobody has actually timed how long it takes to pull one.
Pair with
Median time to retrieve a named trace

Oversight override rate

Why it matters
The number that separates a checkpoint that catches real problems from one that only ever agrees.
How it misleads
A healthy-looking override rate can still come from one overworked reviewer overriding everything near a deadline, not the checkpoint design working as intended.
Pair with
Reviewer time spent per checkpoint decision

Time to reconstruct a named past answer

Why it matters
The most concrete test of whether the records surface actually works, run against one real decision instead of a policy claim.
How it misleads
A fast reconstruction time for one convenient, recent decision says nothing about whether an older one, near the edge of the retention window, still resolves at all.
Pair with
Retention window remaining for the decision reconstructed

p95 vendor attestation age

Why it matters
How stale the oldest-checked fifth of your vendor commitments actually are, which the median alone won't show.
How it misleads
A young median age can still hide a handful of long-forgotten, high-tier vendor dependencies sitting well past their re-attestation window.
Pair with
Number of sub-processors added by a vendor since its last attestation

Declaration-to-report latency for an AI incident

Why it matters
How long it takes a declared incident to reach whoever has to act on or disclose it.
How it misleads
A fast latency paired with zero incidents declared in a long period is at least as often a sign the definition is too narrow as a sign nothing went wrong.
Pair with
Number of incidents declared in the same period
What this is built from

Verifiable, not claimed.#

No invented compliance stats. Just what's already documented on this site, and what a real diligence pass actually found.

Sources

  1. EUR-Lex - Regulation (EU) 2026/1744

    The regulation text our governance page's compliance claims are checked against. Retrieved 2026-08-24.

  2. European Commission - AI Act Service Desk: Article 113

    The official guidance on the entry-into-force article our governance page cites. Retrieved 2026-08-24.

  3. NIST - AI Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0)

    The risk-management functions our governance and adoption controls map onto. Retrieved 2026-08-24.

This page describes what a governance program has to produce to survive an audit, a diligence pass, or a regulator's question. It's the controls we build for clients so the answer exists before someone asks, not a legal opinion on what applies to your organization. It is not legal advice; your counsel makes the actual compliance call for your situation.

Not sure what you could actually produce today

A Ship Audit checks this program against your specific systems and tells you which surface is actually covered, versus which one just looks covered on paper.

Questions

Before you tell a regulator or a buyer 'we have this.'#

What teams ask us before they stand up an AI governance program.

01 We're not building a high-risk system. Do we need any of this?

The register, an accountable owner, and a system card cost little and answer a question someone will eventually ask regardless of classification. Scale the rest, the oversight checkpoint, the re-attestation clock, to what the classification tier above actually calls for, rather than skipping the whole page because one label doesn't apply.

Link to this answer: We're not building a high-risk system. Do we need any of this?
02 Isn't this the same thing as the security review?

No. The security review is questionnaire prep to get one feature past InfoSec, Privacy, Risk, and Procurement once, before it ships. Governance is the standing regime that still has to hold a year later, long after that one review passed: register, oversight, records, disclosure, vendor re-attestation, incident reporting.

Link to this answer: Isn't this the same thing as the security review?
03 Who actually owns AI governance in a 200-person company?

Nobody, by default, which is exactly the inventory surface's first problem to fix. In practice it's a named individual, often in engineering leadership or risk rather than a dedicated AI ethics hire that doesn't exist yet, accountable for the register and the re-review trigger, with the actual checkpoint and disclosure work distributed to whoever owns each system.

Link to this answer: Who actually owns AI governance in a 200-person company?
04 What actually changed with the EU AI Act in 2026?

The high-risk compliance deadlines moved later; the prohibited-practices rules, the transparency duties, and the general-purpose-AI obligations did not. See the linked insight for the specific dates and what stayed in place.

Link to this answer: What actually changed with the EU AI Act in 2026?
05 Do we need ISO 42001 certification?

Certification is a business decision about what a specific customer or deal requires, not a universal requirement. The underlying controls ISO/IEC 42001 asks for (a system inventory, a defined oversight process, documented risk treatment) largely overlap the six surfaces on this page, so building to this page gets most of the way there whether or not you ever pursue the certificate.

Link to this answer: Do we need ISO 42001 certification?
06 What do we actually hand an auditor on day one?

The register entry for the system in question, its current system card, the last completed re-review, and a sample decision log with its version resolved end to end. If any one of those four takes more than a day to produce, that's the gap to close first.

Link to this answer: What do we actually hand an auditor on day one?
Check the register, not the memory

A hand-maintained register usually goes stale within a quarter, and rubber-stamp oversight rarely gets caught until it matters. AI Readiness scores your own program against the same six surfaces this page maps.

Source: https://customlabs.io/governance/

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